There are certain photographs from history that ought to make the rest of us distinctly nervous. Powerful men sitting around enormous tables, surrounded by flags, military advisers and enough self-importance to fill a small aircraft carrier. They smile, shake hands and discuss the future of the world, while the people who actually live in the countries under discussion are left wondering whether anybody remembered to invite them.
In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin gathered at Yalta to discuss the future of Europe. Eighty-one years later, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are gathering in Shenzhen, China, for a meeting that raises some remarkably similar questions about the concentration of global power. The leaders of the United States, Russia and China are discussing nuclear weapons, international security and conflicts whose consequences could shape the lives of billions.
And what a remarkable collection of characters we have. One has spent years waging a devastating war in Europe, apparently determined to redraw the continent's borders through force. Another leads a country whose government openly reserves the right to use military force against Taiwan. And the third is Donald Trump, a man who has accumulated 34 felony convictions on counts of falsifying business records, presided over a deeply controversial war with Iran, suffered a damaging midterm election result and continues to attract questions about his former association with Jeffrey Epstein.
The underlying concern is strikingly familiar to events seen in the 1940s: what happens when the world's most powerful leaders begin treating the sovereignty of smaller nations as something they can negotiate among themselves? And perhaps more importantly, what happens when the man supposedly representing the interests of the Western world is someone whose judgement, personal interests and potential vulnerabilities are themselves the subject of enormous controversy?
That is the question hanging over the APEC summit in Shenzhen. And it is considerably more important than which leader gets the largest chair. Though it should probably be Trump, as he is the fattest mess.
Let's begin with Vladimir Putin, a man who has spent nearly five years demonstrating that invading your neighbour is considerably easier than working out what to do afterwards. When Russian forces entered Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow appeared to anticipate a relatively swift military campaign. Instead, Putin unleashed the largest European land war since the Second World War, leaving cities destroyed, millions displaced and an entire continent reconsidering its defence arrangements.
The war has become an extraordinary exercise in human suffering, military expenditure and political stubbornness. Putin has repeatedly justified his actions through claims about Russian security, NATO expansion and the protection of Russian-speaking populations. Ukraine, understandably, takes a rather different view, namely that being invaded by a larger neighbour is generally considered an act of aggression rather than an unsolicited home-improvement project.
And now Putin arrives in Shenzhen, where he will sit alongside the leaders of China and the United States as an apparently indispensable participant in discussions about world peace. The symbolism is extraordinary. A leader responsible for launching a devastating war against a sovereign European country is being welcomed to a diplomatic gathering at which his opinions on international stability will presumably be treated with great seriousness. It's rather like inviting the man who set fire to your house to chair the neighbourhood fire-safety committee.
According to reporting ahead of the summit, Ukraine is not expected to feature prominently on the formal agenda, despite the war remaining one of the most consequential conflicts in the world. China has reportedly been reluctant to turn the meeting into a discussion of a European conflict. That position is understandable from Beijing's diplomatic perspective, but it illustrates the peculiar priorities of modern great-power politics. A war that has devastated a European country can apparently become a secondary consideration when the world's three most powerful leaders have more important matters to discuss.
The danger is that Putin emerges from the meeting with something valuable even if nothing is formally agreed: international recognition as a leader whose military aggression has not prevented his return to the highest diplomatic table. And if that is the lesson of Ukraine, one wonders what incentive it provides to the next powerful country contemplating a spot of territorial expansion.
Xi Jinping is perhaps the most interesting of the three, partly because he tends to avoid the theatrical excesses of his counterparts. Trump can turn a diplomatic disagreement into a television spectacular before his breakfast McMuffin and three pints of Coca-Cola, while Putin delivers his threats with the warmth of a Siberian winter, often with his top off, of course. Xi, by contrast, appears perfectly content to sit quietly, smile politely and allow everybody else to exhaust themselves.
But beneath that comparatively restrained presentation lies one of the most consequential geopolitical ambitions of the modern era. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has consolidated authority within the Chinese Communist Party, strengthened state control and overseen an extraordinary expansion of China's military and technological capabilities. His government has pursued a more assertive international role, and nowhere are the potential consequences more serious than Taiwan.
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China and has consistently maintained that reunification must eventually occur. Xi has refused to rule out the use of force. Taiwan, meanwhile, governs itself democratically and has no apparent desire to have its future decided by a committee in Beijing, particularly one whose membership it doesn't get to vote for.
The problem is that Taiwan isn't simply a regional territorial dispute. It is also central to the global technology economy. The island plays an extraordinarily important role in manufacturing advanced semiconductors, the chips that power everything from smartphones and artificial intelligence to military systems and modern industrial equipment. A serious confrontation over Taiwan could therefore disrupt global supply chains on a scale that would make recent economic shocks look rather modest. Indeed, Admiral Philip Davidson, the former commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, famously warned in 2021 that China could be capable of attempting military action against Taiwan by 2027. That was a warning about capability rather than a prediction of a fixed invasion date, but it is hardly reassuring.
China is simultaneously a manufacturing powerhouse, an enormous consumer market, a major trading partner for the United States and a strategic competitor to Washington. Beijing has substantial economic incentives to avoid a catastrophic confrontation, but it also possesses political objectives that cannot be reduced to a balance sheet.
Xi is hosting the summit in Shenzhen, one of China's most important technology and manufacturing centres. It's an appropriate setting for a leader who wants to demonstrate that China has become indispensable to the modern world. The meeting allows Beijing to present itself as a central diplomatic power, capable of bringing together the leaders of Russia and the United States. And perhaps that's the cleverest part of Xi's strategy. While Trump and Putin generate headlines through military confrontations and political controversy, China can present itself as the responsible adult in the room.
Whether that image survives closer examination of Beijing's own ambitions is another matter entirely. It's a little like watching two men argue over ownership of a house while the quietest third participant is already measuring up the curtains.
Then we arrive at Donald Trump, whose presence introduces an entirely different level of unpredictability. And for those of us in the West, arguably the most worrying element of the entire meeting.
Trump enters this summit following a bruising midterm election result, with his domestic political authority weakened and congressional scrutiny likely to intensify. His legal and political history is extraordinary for a sitting American president. In 2024, a New York jury convicted him on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. He has consistently maintained that the prosecution was politically motivated, but the convictions remain part of his public record.
And then, of course, there is Jeffrey Epstein.
It is difficult to imagine a more politically uncomfortable subject for a president who has spent so much of his career demanding transparency from everybody else. Trump and Epstein were socially acquainted for years, appearing together at events and in photographs during the 1990s and early 2000s. Trump has acknowledged knowing Epstein but says their relationship ended long before Epstein's 2019 arrest.
Yet the release of millions of pages of Epstein-related records has ensured that the subject remains firmly in the public conversation. According to CNN's examination of the January 2026 release, Trump's name appeared more than 1,000 times in that tranche of approximately three million documents. Other searches across the wider released material have produced much larger figures, including reports of tens of thousands of references, although those counts depend on the documents and search methods involved.
The political problem is obvious. Epstein was a convicted sex offender whose relationships with wealthy and influential people have become the subject of enormous public scrutiny. The repeated appearance of the president's name in records associated with that investigation inevitably generates questions, particularly when the public has been promised transparency and then confronted with a complicated process of releases, redactions and disputes over what remains undisclosed.
And then we arrive at Russia, where the story becomes even more uncomfortable.
For years, allegations have circulated that Russian intelligence may possess compromising material, or kompromat, involving Trump. Some of the most sensational claims originated in the Steele dossier, a collection of intelligence reports circulated during the 2016 presidential election. Those allegations attracted enormous attention but were not substantiated, and several important claims were subsequently challenged or discredited.
Especially the ones about him getting pissed on.
But the broader question is considerably more serious than the rather extraordinary imagery associated with that particular allegation. Russia has a long history of intelligence gathering, political influence operations and attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities of foreign officials. Putin himself is a former KGB officer, and his government has developed a reputation for dealing with political opponents in ways that make a strongly worded letter from one's solicitor seem positively delightful. There have been poisonings, suspicious deaths and a remarkable number of people discovering that Russian windows can apparently open at the most unfortunate moments. Entirely accidentally, of course.
The issue isn't simply whether Putin possesses some mysterious file on Trump. It's that the American president enters these negotiations carrying a collection of personal controversies, financial questions and political vulnerabilities that would be deeply concerning in almost any other Western leader.
We've previously explored this subject under the deliberately provocative question, Is Trump Putin's Bitch? And while the language is hardly diplomatic, the underlying question is an important one. Why does Trump so frequently appear more comfortable flattering Putin than confronting him? Why has he repeatedly questioned traditional Western alliances while demonstrating such apparent enthusiasm for personal relationships with authoritarian leaders? And why should European governments feel confident that their interests will be defended by a president whose approach to diplomacy so often appears to depend on whether somebody has complimented him recently?
These are questions about judgement and negotiating leverage, not merely about personal scandal. A leader can be compromised by financial interests, political incentives, vanity or a desperate desire for recognition without anybody possessing a secret videotape. Sometimes the most effective way to influence somebody is simply to understand what they want to hear.
And Trump has never been particularly mysterious on that front.
The uncomfortable reality is that Putin and Xi are highly experienced political operators who have spent years consolidating power, studying their adversaries and pursuing long-term strategic objectives. Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated an extraordinary willingness to improvise on matters of international importance, contradict his own advisers and confuse personal relationships with national interests.
Imagine sending somebody to negotiate the sale of your house when the buyer knows his financial difficulties, understands his personal weaknesses and has spent years flattering him. You might reasonably wonder whether he's going to secure the best possible price or simply return home delighted that the buyer called him a tremendous businessman.
Now imagine the house is Western Europe.
That is the concern.
One can almost picture the diplomatic briefing: nuclear weapons, Ukraine, Iran, trade relations and, somewhere near the bottom, a polite request that nobody mention Jeffrey Epstein over lunch. Meanwhile, Putin is presumably wondering how much of the meeting can be spent discussing Trump's greatness before somebody remembers why they came.
And then there is Iran. The American war has produced enormous geopolitical uncertainty, disrupted energy markets and raised the possibility of a wider regional confrontation. Trump has argued that his administration's military actions are necessary to protect American interests and counter Iranian threats. Critics argue that the conflict risks drawing the United States into another prolonged war, with consequences that could extend far beyond the Middle East.
Whatever one's position on the conflict, it is an extraordinary backdrop for a meeting supposedly devoted to international peace. Trump is effectively attempting to negotiate with two major geopolitical rivals while simultaneously managing a war, domestic political setbacks and an increasingly complicated international environment. There is something almost Shakespearean about it, although Shakespeare generally managed to give his principal characters a little more self-awareness.
And this is the central concern for the West. We are relying, to a considerable extent, on Donald Trump to represent Western strategic interests in discussions with two of the most experienced authoritarian leaders in the world. A man whose political judgement has repeatedly been questioned, whose personal affairs remain controversial and whose negotiating style frequently seems to prioritise the appearance of victory over the substance of an agreement.
If this is our champion, one can only hope somebody has remembered to give him a very detailed briefing. Preferably with pictures.
In February 1945, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin gathered at Yalta, in Crimea, to discuss what Europe would look like after the Second World War. Nazi Germany was approaching defeat, and the three Allied leaders were attempting to establish the foundations of the post-war international order. Unfortunately, rather a lot of the people whose futures they were discussing weren't invited. Poland, for example, discovered that being one of the countries whose invasion had helped trigger the war didn't necessarily guarantee much influence over what happened to it afterwards.
Yalta has since become shorthand for the uncomfortable reality of great-power diplomacy: the world's most powerful countries sitting around a table and deciding what happens to everybody else. The historical settlement was considerably more complicated than three men casually dividing up Europe, but Soviet domination of Eastern Europe became one of the defining consequences of the war's aftermath. Churchill and Roosevelt secured promises concerning democratic elections, but Stalin ultimately exercised control over much of the territory occupied by Soviet forces.
And now, more than eighty years later, we have Trump, Putin and Xi. Three men meeting to discuss the international order, with Ukraine, Taiwan and numerous other countries having every reason to wonder whether their interests will be adequately represented. It's Yalta with considerably better catering, more expensive suits and the added complication that one of the participants might announce the outcome on social media before the meeting has actually finished.
Of course, the personalities are rather different. Churchill was defending Britain's interests after nearly six years of war, Roosevelt was attempting to construct a lasting international peace, and Stalin was busy ensuring that Eastern Europe would enjoy the sort of freedom normally associated with a locked garden shed. Today's leaders arrive with their own competing ambitions, political difficulties and military objectives.
But there is another difference that should concern us.
At Yalta, the Western powers were represented by Churchill and Roosevelt, two leaders who understood the strategic importance of maintaining a balance of power in Europe, even if their ability to constrain Stalin was severely limited. Today, the United States is represented by a president who has repeatedly questioned the value of traditional alliances, clashed with European leaders and expressed an almost theatrical admiration for certain authoritarian strongmen.
Churchill had his own agenda, and Roosevelt's judgement at Yalta remains the subject of historical debate. But imagine Churchill arriving at the conference and spending the first afternoon telling Stalin what an extraordinary leader he was, complaining about Britain's allies and suggesting that perhaps Poland should simply be grateful for whatever arrangement the Soviet Union proposed.
One suspects the subsequent history of Europe might have been even less encouraging.
And perhaps the most troubling possibility isn't that these three leaders will fail to reach an agreement. It's that they might reach one that suits them perfectly.
Because history suggests that when powerful nations start negotiating spheres of influence, the smaller nations tend to discover that their sovereignty has become a rather flexible concept. Ukraine might reasonably object to its territory being discussed without its participation. Taiwan might have something to say about its future being treated as a bargaining chip. And Europe, having spent the best part of eighty years dealing with the consequences of the last great-power settlement, could be forgiven for asking whether anybody has bothered reading the minutes from the previous meeting.
Yalta is a revealing historical parallel because it illustrates something subtler and potentially more consequential: the temptation to treat the world as a collection of territories to be managed by whoever happens to possess the largest army. And if the lesson of Yalta is that promises made around a conference table mean considerably less than the realities of power on the ground, then perhaps the rest of the world should be paying rather close attention to what happens in Shenzhen.
After all, the last time three world leaders gathered in Crimea to discuss Europe's future, the consequences lasted for generations. One can only hope that this time somebody has thought to invite the people whose countries they're discussing.
Three nuclear powers and an extremely uncomfortable conversation
There is, however, a subject that makes all the historical comparisons considerably less amusing: nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia possess the overwhelming majority of the world's nuclear warheads, while China has been expanding and modernising its arsenal. The expiry of the last major US-Russia strategic nuclear arms control treaty in February 2026 removed an important framework limiting the two countries' deployed strategic weapons. Trump has expressed interest in negotiating a replacement arrangement that includes China, but Beijing has historically resisted joining the same framework, arguing that its arsenal remains much smaller than those of Washington and Moscow.
The problem is that each country approaches nuclear negotiations from a different position. Russia wants recognition of its strategic interests and an arrangement that accommodates its broader security concerns. China wants to preserve its ability to modernise its forces without accepting restrictions designed around the much larger American and Russian arsenals. The United States wants to limit nuclear risks while maintaining its strategic advantages.
It's an extraordinarily difficult diplomatic puzzle, and unlike most puzzles, getting this one wrong could end civilisation.
This is why the meeting itself should not automatically be dismissed. However objectionable the conduct of individual leaders, communication between nuclear powers remains essential. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated just how quickly confrontation can bring the world towards catastrophe, and subsequent arms control agreements helped establish mechanisms for managing the danger.
The problem is not that Trump, Putin and Xi are talking. They absolutely should be talking. The problem is whether their discussions produce meaningful commitments that reduce international risks, or merely a series of vague declarations followed by photographs of three men looking extremely pleased with themselves.
And this returns us to Trump's negotiating ability. The stakes are too high for diplomacy to become an exercise in personal vanity. Putin and Xi will arrive with carefully considered strategic objectives, and the United States needs a president capable of understanding not only what is being offered, but what is being conceded in return. There is a considerable difference between achieving peace and announcing that peace has been achieved. Trump, in particular, has occasionally appeared rather more enthusiastic about the second part.
What does this mean for financial markets?
For traders and investors, the consequences of this meeting could extend far beyond diplomatic theatre. The relationships between the United States, China and Russia influence energy markets, global supply chains, currencies, defence spending, technology investment and the broader direction of international trade.
Start with oil. The American war with Iran has created uncertainty around production, shipping routes and the security of energy supplies. Any suggestion that Washington, Moscow and Beijing are moving towards an understanding that reduces the risk of escalation could ease some of the geopolitical pressure on energy prices. Conversely, a deterioration in relations or an indication that the conflict might widen could produce renewed volatility.
And this matters well beyond the oil market itself. Higher energy prices can increase transport and manufacturing costs, contribute to inflation and complicate central-bank decisions on interest rates. That, in turn, affects government bonds, currencies, company earnings and consumer spending. A disagreement in a conference room in Shenzhen can therefore influence the price of petrol in London, airline tickets in Johannesburg and borrowing costs in New York.
China's relationship with the United States is equally important. Trade restrictions, tariffs, access to advanced semiconductors and rare-earth materials all influence major industries. Any movement towards more predictable commercial relations could improve business confidence, while renewed confrontation could affect technology companies and manufacturers across the world.
Russia's relationship with Europe adds another layer of uncertainty. The war in Ukraine has already changed European energy policy, increased defence expenditure and altered international trading relationships. Any meaningful movement towards a settlement would have economic consequences, but a prolonged conflict would continue to impose costs on governments, businesses and households.
Gold may also attract attention as investors assess geopolitical risks, although its price is influenced by interest rates, the dollar and numerous other factors. The broader point is that international political uncertainty can affect almost every major asset class, even when the immediate headlines appear to concern countries thousands of miles away.
And there is a final consideration that traders sometimes overlook. Markets do not simply respond to whether news is good or bad. They respond to whether developments are better or worse than expected. A summit that produces nothing may be interpreted positively if investors feared confrontation. A carefully worded agreement may disappoint if markets had anticipated something more substantial.
In that sense, today's gathering has all the ingredients of an extremely expensive game of poker. Three powerful participants, enormous stakes, incomplete information and several players who may be bluffing. Unfortunately, the West's representative is a man who has spent much of his career telling everybody how brilliant he is at poker, while occasionally appearing to have forgotten which cards he's holding.
The difference is that when the average poker player loses, he goes home without his money. When these gentlemen make a serious miscalculation, the rest of us may end up paying for it.
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this gathering is the possibility that international politics is drifting towards an older model in which powerful countries regard neighbouring regions as their natural spheres of influence.
The idea is hardly new. Throughout history, empires and great powers have attempted to establish control over surrounding territories, often justifying their ambitions through security concerns, historical claims or economic necessity. The problem is that the populations living inside those supposed spheres of influence rarely appreciate being treated as someone else's strategic property.
Ukraine is a sovereign country, not an item on Putin's diplomatic shopping list. Taiwan's future cannot simply be reduced to a bargaining chip in negotiations between Washington and Beijing. And smaller nations throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East have their own governments, populations and legitimate interests.
Yet the temptation for powerful leaders to make grand bargains remains enormous. A settlement that recognises one country's interests in a particular region might be exchanged for concessions elsewhere. Such arrangements can appear attractive to negotiators seeking stability, but they become dangerous when the rights of the affected populations are treated as secondary.
And that is where the Yalta comparison becomes particularly useful. The problem with the post-war settlement was not that Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to establish peace. They had every reason to do so. The problem was that agreements made by powerful leaders could not overcome the realities of Soviet military control in Eastern Europe. Promises of political freedom were of limited value when the country making those promises already possessed the means to prevent them from being fulfilled.
The lesson for today is straightforward. Any international agreement must be judged not simply by the photographs, declarations and diplomatic language surrounding it, but by what actually happens afterwards.
Does Russia respect Ukraine's sovereignty? Does China reduce the risk of military confrontation over Taiwan? Does the United States pursue a sustainable resolution to the conflict with Iran? And do all three countries demonstrate that international rules apply to powerful states as well as weaker ones?
Those are the questions that matter. Everything else is conference-room decoration.
There will undoubtedly be carefully arranged photographs from Shenzhen. Trump will smile and look faintly baffled, Putin will maintain his familiar expression of homoerotic manliness, and Xi will appear serenely confident that he is the only person in the room who is thinking 3 moves ahead.
The official statements will almost certainly speak of constructive dialogue, mutual understanding and the importance of international stability. There may be references to historic progress, shared interests and the need for continued engagement. With any luck, there might even be something substantive buried among the diplomatic pleasantries.
And diplomacy is worth pursuing. A meaningful agreement on nuclear arms control, progress towards reducing the conflict with Iran or measures that lower the risk of confrontation between the world's largest powers would be welcome developments. But we should not confuse the importance of diplomacy with admiration for the people conducting it.
Putin remains responsible for launching a devastating invasion of Ukraine. Xi leads an authoritarian political system whose government reserves the right to use force against Taiwan. Trump enters the meeting with an extraordinary record of political controversy, criminal convictions, an ongoing war and unresolved public questions surrounding his former association with Jeffrey Epstein. Meanwhile, the rumours surrounding Russian kompromat, however speculative, continue to hang over his relationship with Putin.
And the central concern remains the same: this is the man representing the United States, and by extension much of the Western world's strategic interests, in negotiations with two leaders who have spent decades pursuing their own geopolitical objectives.
These are not three neutral referees arriving to settle a disagreement. They are three leaders whose own decisions and ambitions are central to many of the problems they are now proposing to discuss.
At Yalta, the world saw what could happen when powerful leaders negotiated the futures of smaller nations without sufficient regard for the people who lived there. The circumstances today are different, and another world war is neither inevitable nor a sensible conclusion to draw from one diplomatic meeting. But the principles at stake are familiar: sovereignty, accountability, military restraint and the danger of allowing power to substitute for international law.
We should hope the summit succeeds in reducing tensions. We should welcome meaningful agreements that make the world safer. But we should also be extremely sceptical of any grand settlement that asks smaller countries to sacrifice their independence for the convenience of larger ones.
And above all, we should be concerned about the quality of the man conducting those negotiations on our behalf.
Because the most dangerous outcome might not be that these three men fail to agree. It might be that they agree on something that benefits them enormously while leaving everybody else to deal with the consequences.
Three men. Three nuclear powers. One conference room. And billions of people waiting outside, hoping somebody remembered that the world doesn't belong to the people sitting at the table.
Keep that Axe sharp. The last great carve-up of Europe didn't end particularly well. Let's hope somebody in Shenzhen has bothered to read the history books. Particularly the American delegation.
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